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THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AS A SECULAR HISTORIC
ARTIFACT OR SACRED RELIGIOUS TEXT: USING
MODROVICH V. ALLEGHENY COUNTY TO ILLUSTRATE
HOW WORDS CREATE REALITY
ANN SINSHEIMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his essay, The 'Ideograph:' A Link Between Rhetoric and
Ideology, Michael Calvin McGee proposes that our system of beliefs is
shaped through and expressed by words. We are consciously and
unconsciously conditioned and controlled by the words we hear and
use. Words carry ideology and convey and create meaning. Like
Chinese characters, words are "ideographs" that "signify and 'contain'
a unique ideological commitment," that is frequently unquestioned.'
McGee also suggests that by understanding that a single word can
carry ideology and that ideology can be expressed in a single word, we
are better able to expose and evaluate ideology and choose to accept or
reject such ideology. However, if we fail to recognize the ideographic
nature of words, we risk creating and promoting a reality that is
removed from our system of beliefs.
For the legal community, McGee's theory of ideograph is an
important tool to understand legal argument and to construct
arguments that effectively persuade decision-makers. When lawyers
and law students select a particular word, we consciously and
unconsciously express a certain view of reality. Our choice of words
can help to resolve conflict and create conflict. Words shape our
jurisprudence.
McGee's theory of ideograph 2 helps to identify when, for
example, a trial or appellate court might view the Ten Commandments
as artifacts of history and when a court might see the Commandments
* Associate Professor of Legal Analysis and Writing, University of Pittsburgh School
of Law. M.A., Linguistics, University of Michigan; J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. The author is also a doctoral student in the English Department at Carnegie Mellon
University. The author thanks Dr. Andreea Ritivoi, Professors Teresa Brostoff and James
Flannery, and Neil Siegel for their comments and support.
1. Michael C. McGee, The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, 66 Q.
J. OF SPEECH 1 (1980), reprinted in CONTEMP. RHETORICAL THEORY 425, 428 (John Louis
Lucaites et al. eds., 1999).
2. Id., reprinted in CONTEMP. RHETORICAL THEORY 425, 428 (John Louis Lucaites et
al. eds., 1999).
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as an expression of religion or ideology. More broadly, ideographic
analysis, with its attention to the words or "ideographs" the courts and
parties use, will allow us to identify some of the many beliefs and
values expressed in this decision-making process and allow us to
examine the role language plays in creating an understanding of
reality.
Through this article, I hope to summarize McGee's theory. To
illustrate, I model how McGee's theory can develop a lawyer's critical
thinking and writing skills by identifying the ideographs in the cases
prior to Modrovich v. Allegheny County3 and by applying these
ideographs to analyze the Modrovich case and the various court
documents filed in the dispute. I also use these materials to offer
practical suggestions as to how ideographic analysis could be used to
construct legal documents. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts on
how ideographic analysis might be used in legal education, focusing
particularly on how they could be used to teach legal writing.
II. UNDERSTANDING IDEOGRAPHS
As McGee illustrates in his essay, words create knowledge and
beliefs as well as express existing knowledge. 4 Words carry ideology
and as we hear and use particular words we are conditioned
unconsciously and consciously to accept the ideology. 5 The words we
select to express an idea or ideology or to persuade another to accept
an idea or ideology may over time become so familiar that we forget
that the words could signify another idea or that an ideology could be
open to question. 6 The words become a means to create a reality, a
"projected environment," which is distinct from an objective reality, or
"human environment. ' 7 For example, we are conditioned to react in a
particular way to words such as "law," "liberty" or "freedom of
religion." 8
3. 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. (noting the way state or political bodies "make rhetoric to persuade us of
necessity and later forget that it's a rhetoric and regard negative judgments of it as
unreasonable.... We make a rhetoric of war to persuade us of war's necessity but then forget
that it is a rhetoric and regard negative popular judgments of it as unpatriotic cowardice."). Id.
7. McGee, supra note 1, at 436.
8. Id. at 428.
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A. Ideographs Shape Reality
We, as a community, accept that ideographic words mean a
certain thing, and the words evoke a certain response. We may not
even be aware of the ideology, but we respond in some particular
manner. We are, in effect, socialized by the words. When words
become charged in this way, they are what McGee refers to as
"ideographs." These ideographs are one of many linguistic
mechanisms used by a community to express its system of values and
beliefs. 1o
Ideographs derive their meaning as they are used publicly to
persuade audiences." Ideographs operate as part of what Celeste
Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites refer to as "the rhetorical
process of public argumentation in which various organized and
articulate interest groups negotiate the problems of resource
distribution in collective life of the community, and there's a shared
rhetorical culture out of which they all draw as they strive to express
their particular interests." 12  By "rhetorical culture," Condit and
Lucaites refer to the range of linguistic usages available to a
community, such as allusions, metaphors, myths, narratives, images
and ideographs. 13 An ideograph is a central element of a rhetorical
culture because "[a]n ideograph is a culturally biased, abstract word or
phrase drawn from ordinary language, which serves as a constitutional
value for a historically situated collectivity."'
14
With regard to the law, judicial opinions represent "a
temporary compromise between competing ideological interests.,' 5
The opinions form a "rhetorical limit" upon which lawyers may draw
upon in the future to negotiate their needs and interests.16 The courts
provide a forum for "a community [to] actively negotiate its common
9. Id.
10. Celeste Michelle Condit, The Rhetorical Limits of Polysemy, reprinted in CONTEMP.
RHETORICAL THEORY 494, 494-95 (John Louis Lucaites et al. eds., 1999).
11. CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT & JOHN LouIS LUCAITES, CRAFTING EQUALITY:
AMERICA'S ANGLO-AFRICAN WORD xiii (1993).
12. Id. at xiv-xv.
13. Id. at xii.
14. Id.
15. Id. at xv. See also Theodore 0. Prosise & Craig R. Smith, The Supreme Court's
Ruling in Bush v. Gore: A Rhetoric of Inconsistency, 4 RHETORIC & PUB. AFFAIRS 605, 607
(2001) (following the work of Marouf Hasian, Jr., as well as Condit and Lucaites, the authors
express law as polysemic, and note that legal advocates make various linguistic choices
according to the context, image or narratives with which they are confronted).
16. CONDIT & LUCAITES, supra note 10, at xv.
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needs and interests."1 7 The parties to a dispute seek "to determine the
'best course of action' in contingent situation ... [where the] '[b]est
course of action' . . . is the result of a consensus."' 8  Judges use
ideographs to express their solution in the dispute; what they believe to
be the best course of action.
Each use of an ideograph adds to the range of available
meanings for a given ideograph. However, the potential meanings of
an ideograph are limited by the way in which an ideograph has been
used in the past by a community, limited by the way an ideograph is
defined in relation to other ideographs, and limited by the way an
ideograph is used to modify and mediate situations. 19 Ideographs are
short forms for the "collective commitments of the members of a
public, and they typically appear in public argumentation as the
necessary motivations or justifications for actions performed in the
name of the public." 20 The word "equality" is one such example of
this "short form.",2' The various ideographs used by a community
express the beliefs and value systems acceptable to that community.
22
Ideographs express what has been deemed "legitimate" or
"reasonable."23 Condit and Lucaites say, "[t]o participate in a
rhetorical culture one thus must pay allegiance to its ideographs,
employing them in ways that audiences can judge to be reasonable.
This does not mean, however, that rhetors need 'necessarily' pay
allegiance to any 'particular' usage or interpretation of an ideograph in
a particular context." 25 They must be mindful of the range of uses
because "[r]hetors who employ ideographs in public discourse seek to
achieve assent of a particular audience and thus are constrained to use
such terms in ways that are more or less consistent with the rhetorical
culture., 26  For example, Condit and Lucaites point out that "[a]n
ideographic phrase such as 'freedom of speech' can take on a wide
range of meanings within the practices of a rhetorical culture,
17. Id. at xii.
18. Id.
19. Id. at xiii.
20. Id. at xii-xiii.
21. CONDIT & LUCAITES, supra note 10, at xv.
22. Id. at xiii ("Taken in their entirety, the ideographs for a particular rhetorical culture
identify the range of acceptable public beliefs and behaviors within any publicly constituted
community."). Id.
23. Id. at xv, xiii.
24. "Rhetors" refers to speakers or writers; people who are addressing a public of some
sort as opposed to members of an audience.
25. CONDIT & LUCAITES, supra note 10, at xiii.
26. Id. at xiv.
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depending upon the particular context in which it is employed and the
specific phenomenon it is used to praise or blame."
27
B. Ideographs Shape the Law
Ideographic analysis is powerful in that it allows us to expose
ideologies that might otherwise remain hidden in a dispute or conflict.
We can, at these moments of conflict, identify and question
assumptions and perhaps change the course we take. For example, we
may take ideographs for granted until conflict among ideographs,
which is distinct from conflicts in meaning around a particular
ideograph, causes ideographs to become the "center-sun about which
every ideograph orbits." 28 McGee claims that it is in these moments of
conflict that we have an opportunity to describe ideology and the use
of power, beliefs and behaviors within a community. 29 For legal
professionals, law students and law professors, ideographic analysis
provides a method to critically evaluate legal discourse. By examining
the vocabulary used in a particular dispute, we can uncover the various
ideologies that are fueling the dispute.
McGee's theory suggests that by studying the vocabulary used
by a particular community, such as the legal community, we will
discover the belief systems operating within that community. By
looking at the use of vocabulary by a particular community over time,
we may also gain an understanding of how communities are persuaded
and conditioned to adopt or adhere to a given belief system. McGee
suggests the need to have a decidedly narrower focus of examination
than what many legal professionals might be used to examining. In
the legal profession, and in legal education, we often draw upon
argumentation theory to understand the way in which language
expresses a belief system and can be used to persuade or to control and
shape outcomes. 30  When we examine an argument, we look at
27. Id. at xiii. See also Marouf Hasian, Jr., Vernacular Legal Discourse: Revisiting the
Public Acceptance of the 'Right to Privacy' in the 1960's, 18 POL. CoMM. 89 (2002) (looking
at public and legal discourse surrounding the acknowledgment of the "right to privacy" using
ideographic methods, Hasian says that "[w]hen we adopt such an approach, we give up the
quest for any pristine, clear, transcendent legal theory and accept the fact that there are always
competing theories vying for legitimacy."). Id.
28. McGee, supra note 1, reprinted in CONTEMP. RHETORICAL THEORY 425, 428 (John
Louis Lucaites et al. eds., 1999).
29. Id. at 436.
30. Id. at 428 (explaining that argumentation theory assumes that the fundamental unit
of analysis is "an integrated set-series of propositions.... To argue is to test an affirmation or
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assertions about the truth-value of a claim. For example, an argument
looks at a claim, such as "'[t]he rule of law' is a primary cultural value
in the U.S."' 3 1 However, if we focus instead on a smaller unit of
analysis, like the term "rule of law," which McGee identifies as an
ideograph, we will be better able to identify the belief systems upon
which such a claim rests.32 Also, we will be better able to understand
and question whoever or whatever has influenced and shaped an
individual's reality.33 We can, in turn, build more effective arguments.
We are conditioned to believe that terms like "rule of law,"
"religion" and "freedom of speech" have obvious meaning, and we
learn to set these types of terms apart. McGee proposes that we not
just look at these terms as part of a proposition or claim, but as "basic
units of analysis" or "structural elements" because these words are
"building blocks of ideology." 34 These words are "one-term sums of
an orientation." 35  They illustrate a "collective commitment to a
,36particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal." These
terms, says McGee, presume to express a belief system held by each
member of a community. 37  Those who rely on ideographs do so
because the logic behind ideographs apparently cannot be questioned:
"Everyone is conditioned to think of 'rule of law' as a 'logical'
commitment just as one is taught to think that '186,000 miles per
second' is an accurate empirical description of the speed of light even
though few can work the experiments or do the mathematics to prove
it."
38
Each ideograph has an etymology, a history, and its current
meaning is linked to its past use, but it is also crucial to look at the
"horizontal meaning" of an ideograph, the way the ideograph functions
presently in different contexts. 39 Different ideographs may not appear
to be in conflict if we just consider their historic uses, but if we look at
the use of ideographs within a particular context, a clash in belief
denial of claims, argumentation is the means of proving the truth of grammatical units,
declarative sentences, that purport to be reliable signal representations of reality."). Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. McGee, supra note 1, reprinted in CONTEMP. RHETORICAL THEORY 425, 428 (John
Louis Lucaites et al. eds., 1999).
34. Id. at 428.
35. Id. at 425.
36. Id. at 435.
37. Id. at 428.
38. McGee, supra note 1, reprinted in CONTEMP. RHETORICAL THEORY 425, 428 (John
Louis Lucaites et al. eds., 1999) at 429.
39. Id. at 432-33.
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systems often becomes apparent. The "consonant relationship can be
restructured, perhaps broken, in the context of a particular
controversy." n  Terms such as "freedom of religion," "history" and
"separation of church and state" have meanings that might not seem to
be in conflict if we consider the meanings used over time, but they
clash with one another as they come to express a particular ideological
view in their present use.
n4
III. USING IDEOGRAPHS AS A TOOL TO IMPROVE LEGAL ANALYSIS AND
WRITING
Modrovich v. Allegheny County42 illustrates how ideographic
analysis can help critically evaluate legal reasoning and can help focus
our writing. By examining the ideographs used by others and by
ourselves, we can enhance our understanding of the issues we face and
the implications of our choices.
A. Modrovich v. Allegheny County: Ideographs Shape Decisions
In Modrovich, the United States Court of Appeals had to
consider whether Allegheny County, a government body, was
endorsing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 3 It decided that the
county did not violate the Constitution by posting the Ten
Commandments; holding, perhaps surprisingly, that the Ten
Commandments do not express religious ideology but historic
significance.44  Judge Fuentes, who wrote the opinion, affirmed the
District Court's ruling, stating that "the plaque" which was given to
the county in 1918 would be perceived by a reasonable observer to
"serve the legitimate secular purposes of 'historic preservation and
commemoration of the rule of law' rather than endorsing religion. 4 5
40. Id.
41. Id. at 433 ("Considered rhetorically as 'forces,' ideographs seem structured
horizontally, for when people actually make use of them presently, such terms as 'rule of law'
clash with other ideographs [like] 'principle of confidentiality' or 'national security,' and in
the conflict come to mean with reference to synchronic confrontations."). Id.
42. 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. Id.
45. Summary and Analysis, 73 U.S.L.W. 1218 (2004) (discussing the holding in
Modrovich).
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The plaque was first placed on the main fagade of the
courthouse in 1918. It remained in that location until sometime before
1976 when it was moved to its current place on the Fifth Avenue side
46
of the courthouse. In 1976, the courthouse, which was built in 1888,
was named a National Historic Landmark.47 Although the plaintiffs
Modrovich and Moore, both atheists, argued that the placement of the
Ten Commandments on the side of the courthouse was government
endorsement of religion, Judge Fuentes rejected their arguments,
stating that "[o]ur country's history is steeped in religious traditions.
The fact that government buildings continue to preserve artifacts of
history does not mean that they necessarily support or endorse the
particular messages contained in those artifacts.
Judge Smith joined the majority opinion, but Judge Gibson
wrote a dissenting opinion stating that the district court judge
improperly resolved factual disputes in the county's favor. Judge
Gibson pointed to "conflicting evidence, particularly with respect to
the present intent of the county officials," and with respect to their
sincerity "when they articulated secular reasons for keeping the Plaque
in place."4 9 Consequently, Judge Gibson believed that the case should
have gone forward so that a jury or judge, acting as the finder of fact,
could resolve these factual issues.
Their decision reflects a choice among a range of ideologies
and corresponding ideographs. The ideographs ultimately chosen to
express their opinion both expresses knowledge and shapes
knowledge. By studying the ideographs they inherit through
precedent, we can sharpen our understanding of a court's rationale
and, in turn, become better at predicting future decisions. For
example, to reach a decision in the case, the court, and the parties who
brought the dispute before the court, encountered what McGee
describes as "a vocabulary of concepts" 5 1 that have conditioned them
to beliefs and behaviors regarding religion and the relationship
between the state and religion. These are the ideographs that influence
the shape and texture of our individual and collective reality regarding
the role of religion in our society. As the court approached this issue,
the judges had already been conditioned to believe in the meanings of
many clusters of ideographs, terms that allow them to explain, justify
46. Modrovich, 358 F.3d at 405-07.
47. Id. at 404.
48. Id. at 414-15.
49. Id. at 415.
50. Id. at 417.
51. McGee, supra note 1, at 428.
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and guide policy. These are the ideographs that, apparently not in
conflict, express our collective commitment to a particular goal.
B. Religious Ideographs Throughout Our Legal History
Terms such as "Establishment Clause," "freedom of religion,"
"separation of church and state" and Thomas Jefferson's notion of "a
wall between church and state" are some of the abstract terms that, as
Condit and Lucaites note in their study of "equality," have become a
sort of "national credo." Derived from the language of the
Establishment Clause, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion,"52 these abstract terms express material
ideas within our culture. The appellate court in Modrovich frequently
explicitly and implicitly draws on these terms and the beliefs they
represent as the court discusses the relevant "law."
The prior case law interpreting and applying the Establishment
Clause contains a body of ideographs that express the range of
meanings available to the court. 53  Although not the only meaning
available to the Third Circuit, the prior case law in this area forms a
"rhetorical limit" as discussed by Condit and Lucaites. The precedent
provides "a shared rhetorical culture" from which the court draws to
express its decision. We can see what will be an acceptable argument
or how an argument might best be framed to advance a client's
position. For example, in discussing how best to determine whether
government action violates the Establishment Clause, the court uses
the terms "secular purpose," "excessive entanglement," "endorsement
or []approval of religion," "religious display," and "religious
activity." 54  Lawyers involved in these cases can illustrate their
knowledge of this rhetorical culture by drawing on this language.
These terms signify our society's ideological commitment to
"prohibit[]... government from...adherence to a religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community." 55  Our
52. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
54. Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 400-01.
55. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch, the Court considered
the constitutionality of the city's holiday display that included a creche and other decorations
normally associated with Christmas. The Court held that the display did not impermissibly
advance religion and therefore was constitutional. Id. at 686.
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concern is over the "'fears and political problems' that gave rise to the
Religion Clauses in the 18th century."
56
In her dissenting opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice
O'Connor offers us some insight as to the shared beliefs these
ideographs express:
Government can run afoul of [the] prohibition
[in the Establishment Clause] in two principal ways.
One is excessive entanglement with religious
institutions, which may interfere with the independence
of the institutions, give the institutions access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared
by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation
of political constituencies defined along religious lines.
The second and more direct infringement is government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message.
57
At an abstract level, we, as O'Connor expresses, share an ideology in
our culture that government and religion should be separate and that
this separation is a positive aspect of our society that should be
preserved. However, at a more concrete level, as we try to implement
this view, we see that our community is in conflict as to exactly what it
means for church and state to be separate.
Although Justice Brennan expressed in his dissenting opinion
in the Lynch case, "[t]he principles announced in the compact phrases
of the Religion Clauses have ... proved difficult to apply, ' 58 we can
see from cases like Lynch and Modrovich that terms such as
"Establishment Clause" or "religious freedom" seem to represent the
"collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined
normative goal.",59 The terms express a commitment to "ensure that
the organs of the government remain strictly separate and apart from
religious affairs, for 'a union of government and religion tends to
56. Id.
57. Id. at 687-88 (cites omitted).
58. Id. at 694.
59. McGee, supra note 1, at 435.
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destroy government and degrade religion. ' ' 60 As the Court expressed
five years later in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, "[w]hether the key
word is 'endorsement,' 'favoritism,' or 'promotion,' the essential
principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very
least prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief.
' 61
While the legal community shares a rhetorical culture, which
includes the separation of church and state, when the Court actually
tries to uphold these principles, the sense of harmony within the
community is lost. Members of the community ascribe different
meanings to the words. The meanings change according to the
interests and values of the members, and where members of the
rhetorical culture once seemed to agree, they now openly conflict. We
see that ideographs derive their meaning from context; their meanings
are flexible and allow for the expression of particular interests which,
at times, conflict with ideographs expressing other interests.
Areas where the meanings deviate can help us to understand
what might be unspoken, or hidden, ideological conflicts. By
identifying the different sets of ideographs the parties use, we can
strengthen our legal analysis. In the context of the Establishment
Clause, one division we observe occurs around the meaning of "the
religion clauses." The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman62 alludes to this
potential clash of ideologies, when it notes the language in the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Its authors did not simply prohibit the
establishment of a state church or a state religion, an
area history shows they regarded as very important and
fraught with great dangers. Instead they command that
there should be 'no law respecting an establishment of
religion.' A law may be one 'respecting' the forbidden
objective while falling short of its total realization. A
law 'respecting' the proscribed result, that is, the
60. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
61. 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989). In County of Allegheny, the Court again addressed
whether a city's holiday display was constitutional; the displays included a creche, a
Christmas tree, and a menorah. The Court held that the creche did violate the Establishment
Clause, but the menorah was constitutional. Id. at 578.
62. 403 U.S. 602. In Lemon, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of two state
statutes that provided state aid to church related schools. The Court held that both statues
were unconstitutional because they involved excessive entanglement between government and
religion. Id. at 611-25.
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establishment of religion, is not always easily
identifiable as one violative of the Clause.
63
Words such as "endorsement," "favoritism," "promotion" and
"respecting" no longer exist in harmony but carry conflicting
meanings reflecting conflicting ideologies.
Justice Burger shows us another meaning and the disagreement
within the rhetorical culture as he discusses in Lynch the flexibility in
the language of the Establishment Clause: "We have refused to
construe the Religion Clauses with a literalness that would undermine
the ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated by history. ' 64 "The
purpose of the Establishment Clause," writes Justice Burger, "was to
state an objective, not to write a statute." 65  He adds "The real
objective of the [First] Amendment was to prevent any national
ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government."
66
As courts use ideographs to resolve disputes, the ideographs
take on different and competing meanings, and the ideographs
associated with a particular ideograph conflict. The "Religion
Clauses," therefore, become associated with, on the one hand,
ideographs such as "respecting," as in "no law respecting the
establishment or religion," "realization" and "proscribed result" that
tend to look at the effects of government action and restrict conduct so
that the government does not influence any religion. While on the
other hand, "Religion Clauses" are associated with "non-literalness,"
"constitutional objective," as in "the purpose of the Establishment
Clause was to state an objective, not to write a statute," "national
ecclesiastical," "exclusive patronage" and "prevent" that allow for
fewer constraints on government conduct as long as it does not
promote a national religion.
The Court in Lynch held that a city holiday display that
included a creche along with decorations like a Santa's house, candy
striped poles, and a Christmas tree did not violate the Constitution
because any benefit the display provides one religion or all religions
was merely "incidental. 67  Justice Burger acknowledged that the
display did advance religion but "on occasion some advancement of
63. Id. at 612.
64. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)).
65. Id. at 678 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
66. Id. (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
728 (1833)).
67. Id. at 683.
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religion will result from governmental action," and this does not make
the action unconstitutional if merely providing an "incidental benefit"
to a religion. 68 In Lynch, the city had a "secular purpose" to "celebrate
the holiday.",69 Burger specifically rejected the dissent's concern that
the display may indicate to some that "the city has aligned itself with
the Christian faith by including a Christian symbol in its display., 70 In
the exchange between the majority and dissenting opinions, we see the
conflicting beliefs expressed through the different use of ideographs.
The majority speaks of a "secular purpose," "incidental benefit," and a
value recognizing a general "religion," while the dissent speaks of the
"Christian faith," "Christian symbols," "Christ's birth," and a need for
government to maintain a "neutral posture.'
C. Religious Ideographs Affecting Our Law Today
As these ideographs will be used again in future conflicts, the
members of the rhetorical community learn to recognize these words
as conveying a particular meaning or ideology. The words are
electrified in that they can, in a single word, convey a belief system.
The words "'do work' in explaining, justifying or guiding policy." 72
Ideographic analysis helps us to identify when a court is using
vocabulary purposefully to convey or advance a certain ideology. We
can look behind the words. When the Third Circuit attempts to resolve
the dispute in Modrovich, they inherit the ideographs and the conflicts
that swirl around these ideographs. Additionally, because they address
a dispute about the Ten Commandments, the court not only inherits the
ideographs associated with the "Establishment Clause," but it also
inherits the ideographs associated with the Ten Commandments.
If we examine the Ten Commandments as an ideograph, we
again see a conflict in ideology expressed through the choice of
vocabulary. Defined in the context of religious doctrine and in relation
to other ideographs in its cluster, the Ten Commandments are
"religious text," "sacred text," and express terms, conditions and the
fundamental beliefs for many religions. The Ten Commandments are
central to Judaism and Christianity, but each accepts a different
version of the Commandments, representative of the ideological
68. Id. at 683.
69. Id. at 681.
70. Id. at 683.
71. Id. at 708-09.
72. McGee, supra note 1, at 434.
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differences between the two theologies.73  As the plaintiffs in
Modrovich express in their Brief in Support of the Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Ten Commandments are regarded differently
by different religions.
The plaintiffs note that the version at the Allegheny County
Courthouse is taken from the King James Version of Exodus and
Deuteronomy and includes a summary section with language from the
Book of Matthew in the Christian Bible.74 They state that the version
is:
a decidedly Christian Protestant one. It differs in a
number of ways from the versions that are accepted
under the Jewish and Roman Catholic Traditions. First
the text of the Ten Commandments on the Plaque is
taken verbatim from the King James Version of the
Bible, which is a Protestant translation that is not used
by Roman Catholics or Jews. Second, the Plaque
completely omits what Jews believe to be the first of
the Ten Commandments, which is the recognition of
the God responsible for the events of the exodus from
Egypt ("God spoke all these words, saying: I the Lord
am your God. . .. "). 75
The brief goes on to explain the numerous differences between the
version on the Allegheny County plaque and versions accepted by the
Jewish, Roman Catholic and Lutheran religions, differences that
express fundamental ideological differences among these different
religions.
The Ten Commandments have also been defined in the legal
context as having a "secular application" as "the fundamental legal
code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
,,76States. However, the role of the Ten Commandments as a
fundamental source of law in Western Civilization is not an
73. THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 531-38 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981).
74. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment at 3 (on file with
author) [hereinafter Pls.' Br.], Modrovich v. Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-357 1). See THE TORAH, supra note 73.
75. Id.
76. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has,
however, repeatedly acknowledged the religious importance of the Ten Commandments,
stating for example, that "[tihe Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish
and Christian faiths." Id.
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uncontested claim. The dispute around this claim provides us with
more ideographs to ponder. For example, Law Professor Marci
Hamilton argues in her article, The Ten Commandments and American
Law, that reading the language of the Commandments "demonstrates
how strained is the claim that American law derives exclusively from
them.",77 She notes that the first four Commandments, if "enacted into
law today," would "constitute plain Constitutional violations." She
asserts that "the first four are religious rules not civil law."78
The first four Commandments deal with a person's relation to
God while the remaining Commandments address conduct related to
human society. Moreover, Hamilton asserts that "[t]he claim that the
Ten Commandments are the foundational source of American law
defies history.",79 In her article, she traces the many other potential
sources of modem law, such as the Code of Hammurabi and the
Magna Carta, and also notes that, although some Christians today
claim the Ten Commandments as the "sole source of the secular law
that binds everyone in secular law," not all Christians regard, nor at all
points in history have Christians regarded, the Ten Commandments in
this way.80 She states that "over the centuries, many Christians have
claimed that the Ten Commandments did not govern their conduct,
because they were given dispensation from the Commandments
through Christ. ' ' 81  She states, instead, that the framers of the
Constitution were influenced by Greek and Roman law, John Locke,
Scottish Common Sense philosophers and Grotius, and that Jefferson
and Adams both were critical of the idea that common law
incorporated the Ten Commandments.
82
Limited by the historical uses discussed above, the ideographs
we see in the pleadings, briefs and court opinions in the Modrovich
case provide a rich array of meanings that conflict with one another
77. Marci Hamilton, The Ten Commandments and American Law, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hailton/20030911.html. See also Joseph R. Duncan, Jr.,
Privilege, Invisibility and Religion: A Critique of the Privilege that Christianity Has Employed
in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REv. 617 (2003).
78. Id. See also Alan Watson, Two Early Codes, the Ten Commandments and the
Twelve Tables: Causes and Consequences, 25 J. LEGAL HIST. 129, 131 (2004) (claiming that
"the Ten Commandments are beyond doubt the most celebrated collection of laws in the
Western World," but also that "they are extremely peculiar"). Id. at 133. He notes that "the
Commandments are split into two very distinctive parts: behaviors toward God, behavior
toward other humans." Id. at 133.
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and reveal the different ideologies involved in the Modrovich case and
in the other Ten Commandments cases around the country. The
historic uses of these ideographs establish the rhetorical limit and
affect how the court and the parties, who form a rhetorical culture, will
address the issue and define the solution. We see in the decision-
making process how the language shapes the understanding of the
parties, the lower court, the appellate court and future parties. The
terms help those involved to achieve "a temporary compromise
between competing ideological interests." 83 They additionally provide
practitioners with a means to enhance their written works.
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT MODROVICH V. ALLEGHENY
The precedent examined above establishes the rhetorical
community that attorneys and courts access to resolve an issue.
Ideally, the attorneys will select language that reflects an
understanding of the rhetorical community. In other words, they will
select ideographs that are consistent with the ideology they wish to
convey.
In this section, I discuss how in the Modrovich case, the
attorneys, on both sides, and ultimately the courts, select ideographs
that neutralize the religious nature of the Ten Commandments and
present the Ten Commandments as an historic plaque. This occurs, in
part, because the attorneys for the plaintiffs failed to consider the
ideology attached to their choice of words such as "plaque" and
"affixed." These words express an ideological view of the
Establishment Clause as preventing the establishment of a national
religion but not precluding government support of religion generally,
thereby enabling the lower and appellate courts to explain the
government action as permissible.
A. The Plaintiff
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
decided that the Ten Commandments represented history and not
religious expression by the state because it selected among a range of
ideographs. These ideographs were presented to the court, in part, by
the parties to the dispute in their legal pleadings which include the
83. CONDIT & LucAIm, supra note 10, at xiv-xv.
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complaint and answer, and their briefs. In these documents, the parties
draw on the ideographs from the prior cases to present their arguments
to the court. For example, as we saw in the dissent in Lynch, which
claimed that the holiday display violated the Constitution because it
expressed "Christian symbols" and the government was not
,,84
"neutral, we see similar terms in the complaint: "the tablet,"
"Christian lobby," and "religious tenets" orbiting around the term "The
Commandments. ' 85
In the complaint filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs
assert that "[iun 1918, Allegheny County mounted a bronze religious
tablet on an exterior wall of its courthouse containing the text of the
Ten Commandments from the Old Testament and other biblical
passages from the New Testament." 86 The plaintiffs continue, "the
tablet remains bolted at eye level . . . near a well-traveled public
sidewalk." 87 The plaintiffs tell us that they are "atheists" and have
"encountered the religious tablet" several times and that they are
"offended" by the "unwelcome contact" with the tablet since they do
"not subscribe to the religious tenets contained in it."88
We learn in the complaint that the "large bronze tablet" was a
gift from the "International Reform Bureau," a group that called itself
"'a Christian lobby' and campaigned to introduce religious principles
into public life through legislation and other means.""8 We are also
told that the tablet, entitled "The Commandments," has "thirteen
references to 'the Lord or God' and articulate such purely religious
concepts as the requirement to worship a single deity .... ,,90 At the
time "the tablet" was accepted, a speech was given by "the Reverend
Wilbur Fisk Crafts" who "characterized the Ten Commandments
during his speech as the 'roots' of religion, government, and social life
in the United States."
9
'
When asked to remove the tablet, the County refused,
responding that the tablet "reflects values that are important to this
community today as they were in the early part of the century." 92 Theplaintiffs claim that by retaining this tablet, "Allegheny County creates
84. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 636.
85. Plaintiffs Complaint (on file with author) [hereinafter Pls.' Compl.], Modrovich v.
Allegheny County, 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-3571).
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id.
88. Id. at n 3,4.
89. Id. at in 9, 13.
90. Id. at n[11, 12.
91. Pis.' Compl. at 14, supra note 85.
92. Id. at 19.
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the appearance to a reasonable observer that the government is taking
a position on question of religious belief rather than maintaining a
position of government neutrality toward religion."
93
B. The Defendant
The answer to this complaint, filed by the County, presents a
different set of terms. The answer uses terms that remind us of Justice
Burger's opinion in Lynch upholding the holiday display, terms like
"secular purpose," "incidental benefit" and "religion" used in a general
sense, not tied to any specific faith. In the defendant's answer, we
now have terms like "the plaque," "principles" and "history" orbiting
around the term "The Commandments." The defendant states that:
[R]eligious principles, ideals and beliefs have impacted
our history and influenced our laws since colonial
times. Principles of conduct embodied in the Ten
Commandments have a particularly solid and
longstanding footing in our civil and criminal laws and
jurisprudence. Indeed, the plaque of the Ten
Commandments at issue in this case was donated to
Allegheny in 1918-in the shadow of World War I-to
honor the rule of law as an alternative to war.9
4
We are told that "the plaque" is one of many other plaques
displayed on the walls. 95 They also note, "affixed to the exterior of the
Courthouse is 'a plaque' that recites the Pledge of Allegiance," which
,,96includes the words "under God. We are told that "the plaque" is not
establishing "an official religious tradition," 97 and we learn that the
County wants to retain "the plaque" because it "adorns" the exterior
wall of "the 112 year old Allegheny County Courthouse," which is "a
National Historic Landmark" that requires "protection. ' 98
93. Id. at$ 15.
94. Defendant's Answer at I (on file with author) [hereinafter Defs.' Answer],




98. Id. at T 19.
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C. The Conflicting Realities
Through its use of ideographs, the complaint expresses the
plaintiffs' view of reality, which is essentially that the "Ten
Commandments" are "a religious tablet" endorsing "Protestant
Christianity" and that the "government" should "unbolt" them and
remove them from the "government building." The answer expresses
the defendant's view of reality, which is essentially that "the old
plaque," which includes the "Ten Commandments," is "a fixture" on
the wall of a "national historic landmark" and cannot be removed.
After filing these pleadings, the parties both filed motions and
supporting briefs in support of their motion for summary judgment,
requesting that the trial judge decide in their favor without having to
go to trial. 99
The parties maintain their positions in their briefs in support of
summary judgment in all but one crucial respect: The plaintiffs'
motions brief no longer refers to the Ten Commandments display as "a
tablet." The plaintiffs' brief now refers to "[a] bronze plaque
containing the text of the Ten Commandments ('the Plaque') [which]
is affixed to an exterior wall of the Allegheny County Courthouse ('the
Courthouse')."' 1°° When I asked the author of this brief to explain the
reason for this change, the author of the brief reported in an e-mail
correspondence that this change from "tablet" to "plaque" was made
because different attorneys wrote the complaint and the brief, and,
therefore in writing the brief, the authoring attorney "wanted to stick to
one consistent term for the Commandments plaque."''
1
This change amounts to much more than consistency in the
wording. Indeed, the term "plaque" provided the author with internal
stylistic consistency since the author of the complaint interchanged the
term "plaque" for "tablet."'10 2 However, the change to the use of only
"plaque" proves crucial because it allows for consistency in ideology
between the plaintiffs and defendant at a point when the parties are
apparently expressing conflict and are urging the court to resolve the
conflict in favor of their particular ideology. The plaintiffs
unknowingly adopt the same ideograph that the defendant uses and
thereby adopt the ideology that accompanies it. The tension among
the ideographs is diffused as the plaintiffs start to use terms in the
99. Pis.' Br. at 20, supra note 74.
100. Id.
101. E-mail correspondence from plaintiffs attorney (Dec. 9, 2004) (on file with author).
102. Pis.' Compl., supra note 85.
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defendant's ideological cluster: terms like "the plaque" and "affixed"
as opposed to "The Ten Commandments" and "bolted" or "mounted."
The use of these terms makes it easier for the trial and appellate
courts to decide in the defendant's favor, since the acceptance of these
terms seems to create "consonance and unity" among terms that might
otherwise appear in conflict. As Condit and Lucaites explain, courts
are to provide a forum for "competing voices," and the judges, as
leaders, are "to determine the 'best course of action' in contingent
situations."1 0 3 This best course of action becomes that which "is the
result of a consensus represented by the assent that an audience, cast in
the role of 'public,' grants to a rhetor, cast in the role of 'leader."
' 104
To gain this assent, leaders "must pay allegiance to [the rhetorical
culture's] ideographs, employing them in ways that audiences can
judge to be reasonable."' 5 In this case, the public the courts must
address are more likely to assent to "the plaque" as something
"secular" rather than "the tablet" or "The Ten Commandments" as
something "secular." The plaintiffs, therefore, in adopting the term
"plaque," have diminished some of their power to present their claim
as a "legitimate ideological interest."
10 6
D. The Courts Determine Reality
Indeed, the district court held in favor of the defendant, stating
that "the reasonable observer" would "not conclude that the continued
display of the Ten Commandments Plaque reflects an intent by the
current county officials to promote or favor one religion over another
or indeed even to promote religion over non-religion.' 0 7  "The
Plaque," the judge says, has been retained by the county because it is
"'an important part of the heritage and tradition of an historic building'
and that the Plaque commemorated the rule of law.'1°8 The judge
disassociates "the plaque" from its content: "The Plaque" is important
because it is "part of the entire Courthouse,"'109 and the County has
"legitimate secular reasons" to retain the plaque, as opposed to




107. Modrovich v. Allegheny, no. 03-357, 36 (Docket) (C.A.3 Aug. 28, 2003) (on file
with author).
108. Id. at 35-36.
109. Id. at 37.
[VOL. 5:325
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
returning "The Ten Commandments" because they are a "sacredtext.",1 10
By the time the controversy reached the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Modrovich v. Allegheny County, III
the appellate court was able to easily define the issue they must
address as "whether the display of a plaque containing the text of the
Ten Commandments on the Allegheny County Courthouse violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution."' 12 In framing the issue as "whether the display of a
plaque" violates the Constitution, the court makes a critical move.
They put forward an ideograph, "a plaque," that allows the court to
push aside the ideographs surrounding the "Ten Commandments" as a
religious text that conflicts with the ideographs surrounding "the
Establishment Clause." For example, the court uses the word "plaque"
187 times in its opinion of approximately 10,000 words. The court
never uses the word "tablet." In contrast, the court uses the word "Ten
Commandments" only thirty-six times, and often when it refers to the
"Ten Commandments," it is referring to another case and not to the
particular Allegheny County Commandments. 113 Again, as we saw in
the pleadings, the briefs and the lower court opinions, "the plaque," in
the appellate court's view, is something permanently "affixed to the
stone wall of the Allegheny County Courthouse." 1 14 Moreover, "the
plaque" has been there "a long time,' '1 15 just like the similar "plaque"
in Chester County, Pennsylvania that the Third Circuit upheld in 2003
as "an historical artifact."I
In Freethought v. Chester County,117 Judge Dalzell of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
dealt with very similar facts: a Ten Commandments plaque, presented
by a Christian organization and posted in 1920 on the fagade of an
historic courthouse, was challenged by an atheist group.118 The district
court, however, held that "[t]he tablet displayed alone outside the
Chester County Courthouse, however much an icon it may be to
110. Id. at 39.
111. 385F.3d397.
112. Id. at 399.
113. "Plaque" is a word that the court can more easily express as "secular" particularly
because the Ten Commandments are commonly discussed as being engraved "on two stone
tablets," available at http:l/www. britannica.com.
114. Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 399.
115. Id. at 403.
116. Id. (discussing Freethought v. Chester County); 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
117. 191 F. Supp. 2d 589 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
118. Id. at 590.
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mainline Protestantism and others, thus runs against the strong current
of disestablishment in this nation, to which the First Amendment only
in recent decades has added its power."'
119
Judge Dalzell was apparently unable to ignore the "sacred"
nature of the text. 12 The history, rather than neutralizing the religious
nature of the text, confirmed for the judge that the text is an expression
of the Protestant faith.12 In the opinion, the judge often refers to the
Ten Commandments as "the tablet," occasionally as "the Ten
Commandments plaque" or simply as "the Ten Commandments."
Only rarely does the court refer to "the plaque" without some
qualification of it as a religious text, saying for example, "Chester
County's history of receiving the plaque demonstrates that it was
'abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a
particular point of view in religious matters' when it accepted the gift
in 1920."
122
However, in Freethought, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court, and, as in Modrovich, the
court referred to the Ten Commandments almost exclusively as "the
Plaque." Noting the county's "desire to preserve a longstanding
plaque," the court stated that "While the reasonable observer may
perceive the Ten Commandments (in the abstract) as portraying a
religious message, he or she would view the plaque as a reminder of
past events in Chester County. Thus, history provides a context which
changes how the reasonable observer would regard the plaque."' 12 3 The
court, earlier in the opinion, stressed "that history provides a context
which can change the effect of a religious display."
124
In Modrovich, the court again relied on "history" as an
ideograph to support its decision, making such statements as "the
Plaque" is a fixture on a courthouse which is a "National Historical
Landmark."' 125 Although "the Plaque" does contain the language of
the Ten Commandments, by accepting "the Plaque" in 1918, during
World War I, the county was acknowledging the role of the
Commandments "in the formation of our laws" and, therefore, had a
"secular purpose."' 26  In fact, the court suggests that over the
119. Id. at 600.
120. Id. at 595.
121. Id. at 599.
122. Freethought, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
123. Freethought, 334 F.3d at 265 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. at 263.
125. Modrovich, 385 F.3d at 404.
126. Id. at 405.
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eighty-plus years that the plaque has hung on the Courthouse, it has
lost its religious quality. People frequently pass by it without a
thought:
It does not hang in any preeminent place, but is
affixed to a side entrance. . . . The Plaque is not
protected from the weather and hangs at street level
unprotected from potential vandalism. The text can be
read when walking immediately past the plaque ... but
not from across the street.
127
Moreover, the county has not "made any effort nor expended any
funds to repair, clean or polish it since 1918.,,128 The plaque is no
different than the other plaques "commemorating various historic
events, people and organizations, for example a victory during the
French and Indian War, a Civil War protest, the Veterans of Foreign
Wars Association, the County's bicentennial celebration, National
POW/MIA Recognition Day, the Pledge of Allegiance and memorials
for private individuals."' 129 Additionally, the case is "distinguishable"
from cases in other circuits finding that the Ten Commandments
displays violate the Constitution, because "this Plaque" is "an historic
artifact" rather than "a new display."'
' 30
Through these ideographs, the court is able to create an
understanding of "the Plaque" as something completely separate from
the religious text it contains. As a result of these ideographs, the court
and the public have a secular understanding of "the Plaque." "The
Plaque" ideograph secularizes the Ten Commandments; "the Plaque,"
as a term, sanitizes, neutralizes, and disassociates the object from the
text which it contains. In the recent Supreme Court decision Van
Orden v. Perry,131 which determined the Ten Commandments on the
Texas State Capitol grounds to be constitutional, the Court selected
similar neutralizing language in the majority opinion. 132 The Court
referred to the Ten Commandments as "the monument" in the majority
and concurring opinions, while the dissenting opinions referred to "the
Commandments.' ' 33  In contrast, in the Supreme Court decision
127. Id. at 408.
128. Id. at 409.
129. Id. at 405-06.
130. Id. at 413-14 (discussing other circuit court decisions).
131. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 34
the Court held the Ten Commandments displayed at the county
courthouses to be unconstitutional; the majority and concurring
opinions referred to "the Commandments," while the dissenting
opinion selected neutralizing language such as "the Foundations
Displays."'1
35
Drawing on reasoning from external sources, like history, may
help a judicial decision appear more objective. According to
Benjamin Genshaft, the Supreme Court and the lower courts use
history to "secularize" religious symbols and practices as a way "to
establish an aura of objectivity."' 136 Additionally, an emphasis on
history and tradition serves the Court's "ideological agenda." In
Modrovich, the use of history appears to serve both the appellate and
lower courts' "ideological agenda," an agenda which appears to be to
preserve the status quo and avoid having to make the controversial
decision of removing the Ten Commandments or which could be to
impose a Protestant Christian perspective. Allowing the court to
express an agenda, the ideographs create the vocabulary that can
condition our behaviors and beliefs.
V. CONCLUSION
The Modrovich case and the supporting texts reveal the
usefulness of the ideograph as a means of studying, attacking and
creating legal arguments. Using ideography to uncover the ideology
of the participants in Modrovich allows us to gain insight into how
language can be used to persuade, to limit and to expand our choices.
Ideographic analysis helps us to expose meaning and allows us to
consider alternate meanings, to challenge the assumptions or logic
upon which these meanings are based, to catch "mistakes," and to
counter ideologies with which we do not agree. Ideographs, therefore,
can provide a useful analytical tool for the attorneys who bring
disputes before the court. Ideographs can help attorneys decide how
exactly to craft an argument. Moreover, viewing words as ideographs
can be used to teach future attorneys to analyze and synthesize legal
opinions, and to generate legal theory and draft documents.
134. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
135. Id.
136. Benjamin S. Genshaft, With History, All Things Are Secular: The Establishment
Clause and the Use of History, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 573, 573-80 (2001).
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Ideographs can be used to design a reading and critical thinking
exercise to teach first year law students how to closely analyze judicial
opinions. For example, students could be given a series of cases to
synthesize and, in addition to determining the rule of law as expressed
in these cases, they could also identify the rhetorical cultures and
subcultures represented in these cases. Such an exercise would help
students to articulate what rhetorical moves courts make to support
their decisions, how courts categorize ideas, and what vocabulary the
legal community uses to express different viewpoints. Students can
also consider what vocabulary and belief systems are used
intentionally and what is used unintentionally or inadvertently.
Ideographs can also be used to sharpen oral communication
and writing skills. After asking students to identify and consider the
various rhetorical cultures that exist in an area of law, such as the
Establishment Clause cases, they could then be asked to apply this
knowledge to resolve a hypothetical problem. They could, for
example, be asked to write a brief on behalf of a client like Modrovich
or to represent the County. In drafting these briefs, they should
consider how they should express their legal theory. They should
consider what vocabulary to use and whether their choice of language
expresses the appropriate ideology. They could also consider whether
the opposing side is expressing hidden ideology that they might be
able to expose. The brief writing exercise could be followed by an
oral argument.
Finally, ideographs could be used as a means of introspection
and as a tool to sharpen students' lawyering skills. For example, if a
student represents Modrovich, but discusses the Ten Commandments
as "the plaque that endorses religion," we could use our knowledge of
ideographs to ask the student whether he or she perceives any
difference between the word "plaque" and the words "The Ten
Commandments." We can also ask the student to consider whether his
or her choice of language is inadvertently conveying ideological
beliefs or whether his or her personal beliefs might be influencing the
choice of language and whether the client's beliefs might perhaps be in
conflict with the student's personal beliefs.
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